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Abstract In this paper, I will argue that presentism is inconsistent with the belief
that God exists in time. The defence of my argument will be split into two sections.
The first will show that if God exists in time and presentism is true, there are some
true propositions about the future. The second will use truthmaker theory to show
that these propositions require an existing future entity to be made true. As the
first section states that some propositions about the future are true, it is the case
that some future entities exist. Hence, if God exists in time then some future entities
exist. This conclusion goes directly against presentism’s fundamental claim, proving
it is inconsistent with the belief that God exists in time.
1 Introduction
Presentism is the view that only the present moment and objects within the present
moment exist.1 It is popular because it is a “common sense” approach to visualising
time and is consistent with how we experience time, as changing from one moment to
the next.2 The importance of presentism has led to a wide discussion of its conjunction
with God’s relationship with time. Notable philosophers such as William Lane Craig
have stated that God’s existence in time (otherwise known as God’s temporality) is
consistent with presentism.3 Alan R. Rhoda goes further in arguing that God’s exist-
ence in time can solve the prominent truthmaker problem for presentism.4 This paper
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will show that the belief God exists in time is inconsistent with presentism. There-
fore, philosophers should consider the possibility that God exists outside of time, reject
truthmaker theory or abandon presentism.
I will present a unique defence which combines God’s effect on the future with
truthmaker theory. Following this introduction, I will summarise my argument, and
its subsequent defence will be divided into sections 3 and 4. In section 3, I will prove
the premise that if God exists in time then there are some true propositions about the
future. Section 4 will be divided into two sub-sections. In section 4.1, I will use truth-
maker theory to show that the propositions discussed in section 3 require an existing
future entity to be made true. In section 4.2, I anticipate various objections which at-
tempt to locate truthmakers in the present moment. These objections fail to supply
truthmakers for the propositions being discussed because they can only be made true
by the existence of the entities that they refer to. As section 3 shows that these propos-
itions are true, it is the case that some future entities exist. Presentists state that future
entities do not exist, hence the conclusion of this paper, that the belief that God exists
in time is inconsistent with presentism. In other words, God cannot only exist in the
present moment.
The rest of this introduction will be used to adapt God’s aĴributes. The God of
classical theism is described as an immutable and simple being who exists outside of
time for all of eternity. If God exists in time and presentism is true, like every other
existing entity which can only exist now, God only exists in the presentmoment.5 Con-
sequently, God’s traditional aĴributes, specifically His immutability, omniscience and
omnipotence, must be discarded or adapted to function within the confines of present-
ism.
Firstly, I discard the aĴribute of immutability. If God is immutable, He is unchan-
ging. If God exists in time and presentism is true, He must change. An outcome of
presentism is that propositions truth values change as time changes. For example, in
the present moment the proposition ‘that I am siĴing down’ is true. In an hour when I
am standing this proposition will be false. God knows it is true in the present moment
and will know it is false in the future. God’s knowledge changes when propositions
change their truth value. Therefore, God changes. I have discussed this aĴribute be-
cause a theist may be reluctant to discard it and argue that its loss is problematic. As
it is an unavoidable outcome of God existing in time and presentism being true, I will
not raise any objections.
The aĴribute of omniscience implies that God’s knowledge is limitless. In this in-
terpretation, God has experienced the past and is experiencing the present moment.
God has knowledge of everything that has occurred in the past and has knowledge of
everything that is occurring in the present moment.6 God’s knowledge of the future
5. Rhoda, “Presentism, Truthmakers, And God,” 53.
6. Ibid., 54.
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is not as easily defined. It depends upon whether it is believed that the future is un-
determined, determined or partly determined. Rhoda’s view on the future is unclear.
However, he does state that God can anticipate the future.7 As I expect Rhoda’s paper
will be used as the main argument against my conclusion, I will maintain that God can
anticipate the future.
Lastly, God’s omnipotence can be redefined as the aĴribute of being all powerful
within the present moment. God cannot directly act in the past or future because they
do not exist. God can only act in the present moment and within the present moment
His power is limitless.
2 Summary of the Argument
I will argue that presentism is inconsistent with the belief that God exists in time. A
summary of my argument is presented below:
1. God exists in time.
2. If God exists in time, He determines the existence of some future entities.
3. Therefore, God determines the existence of some future entities (from 1 & 2).
4. If God determines the existence of some future entities, propositions about those
future entities are true.
5. Therefore, some propositions about the future are true (from 3 & 4).
6. Aproposition about an entitywhose existence is caused by the direct intervention
of God is made true by the existence of that entity.
7. If propositions about entities whose existence are caused by the direct interven-
tion of God are true, it entails that those entities exist.
8. Therefore, some future entities exist (from 6 & 7).
9. If any wholly past or merely future entities exist, presentism is false.
10. Therefore, presentism is false.
Presentism is inconsistent with premise (1), the belief that God exists in time.
Premise (1) is assumed as true. The defence of the argument will be divided into two
sections. Section 3 will defend premises (2) to (5). Section 4 will defend premises (6)
to (8). The entities referred to in premises (6) and (7) are defined as ‘entities who will
exist in the future because of the direct intervention of God in the present moment’,
this will be abbreviated to E for the rest of this paper.
7. Ibid., 53.
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3 Premises (2) - (5)
Premise (2) states that if God exists in time, He determines the existence of some future
entities. This section will prove premise (2) and then will explain the steps taken to
reach premises (4) to (5). The following scenario explains God’s effect on the future,
which results in premise (2). God can perform an action X in the presentmoment. If the
purpose of action X is the intended outcome Y, it is the case that Y will occur. In other
words, if God performs action X with the intention of Y, Y will happen. The outcome
could be the existence of an entity. Hence, God could act in the present moment to
bring about the existence of an entity in the future. It should be noted that similar
arguments have previously been made. For example, it has been argued that if God
wills for a future event to happen then that event will happen.8 I will now explain, in
greater detail, how action X leads to the outcome Y, showing that the existence of some
future entities is determined by God’s actions in the present moment.
If God performs action X with the intention of effect Y, Y will happen:
1∗. God performs action X.
2∗. God’s sufficient reason for performing action X is the outcome Y.
3∗. God has the sufficient reason to act in eachmoment leading up to Y, to ensure that
Y will happen.
4∗. God is omniscient and consequently has the knowledge in each moment leading
up to Y, to know how to make Y happen.
5∗. God is omnipotent and can accordingly directly intervene in eachmoment leading
up to Y, to ensure Y happens.
6∗. Therefore, it is the case that the Y will occur (from 3∗, 4∗ & 5∗ ).
Premises (2∗ ) to (3∗ ) explain why outcome Y must occur after action X has been
performed. Theists maintain that God’s actions always have a reason because they
would not have faith in a whimsical being. God’s sufficient reason for performing ac-
tion X is Y. Consequently, if Y does not happen then action X would be arbitrary, an
unacceptable outcome for theists. For example, if it was argued that after performing
X God changed His mind, and brought about an outcome different to Y, it would sub-
sequently have to be admiĴed that God performed a pointless action. Further actions
might be required after X to cause Y, such as stopping future events which could pre-
vent Y. God is unable to directly act in the future from the present moment because
8. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (N.Y.: Ben-
ziger Brothers, 1947).
Can God Only Exist in the Present Moment? 51
the future does not exist. Hence, premise (3∗ ) states that God can act in every moment
leading up to Y, to prevent possible events from affecting the existence of Y.
Premises (4∗ ) and (5∗ ) both use God’s aĴributes to show how further actions could
be carried out to ensure that Y will happen. Premise (4∗ ) utilizes God’s omniscience to
demonstrate that in each moment leading up to Y, God knows how to make Y happen.
Premise (5∗ ) refers to the aĴribute of omnipotence, which is defined as God being all
powerful in the present moment. God has the power, in each moment leading up to
the outcome, to ensure that the outcome will happen. As a result of premises (2∗ ) to
(5∗ ), after action X has been performed with the intention of bringing about Y, it is the
case that Y will occur.
To summarise, God can perform an action in the present moment which will bring
about an outcome in the future. This could be the existence of an entity, thus proving
premise (2). If God exists in time, He determines the existence of some future entities,
resulting in premise (3), God determines the existence of some future entities. If the
existence of some future entities is determined, those entities will exist in a certain
way. Propositions which refer to how those entities will exist are true. This leads to
premise (4), if God determines the existence of some future entities, propositions about
those future entities are true. Premise (5) follows from premise (4), there are some true
propositions about the future.
4 Premises (6) - (8)
This section has been divided into two sub-sections. Section 4.1 introduces truthmaker
theory which is used in premise (6); a proposition about an entity whose existence is
caused by the direct intervention of God is made true by the existence of that entity.
It will explain the problem that this causes for presentism. Section 4.2 discusses anti-
cipated objections to premise (6). These objections will deny that propositions about E
require the existence of E to bemade true. The end of this section explains howpremise
(6) leads to premise (7), which results in premise (8).
4.1 Premise (6)
Premise (6) refers to truthmaker theory, which states that true propositions require
a truthmaker, something in virtue of which they are true.9 Propositions which refer
to a portion of reality can be made true by a truthmaker, the corresponding part of
reality. Hence, the truth of a proposition, by the means of a truthmaker, is grounded
9. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, “Why Truthmakers”, in Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, ed.
Julian Dodd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 17.
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in reality.10 Propositions which do not have a truthmaker are ungrounded, being true
or false regardless of reality. Such propositions are avoided in philosophy because they
lack justification and do not refer to fact. Truthmaker theory is an evaluative tool used
to rule out “dubious ontologies”11 which are “unwilling to accept an ontology robust
enough to bear the weight of the truths [they feel] free to invoke”.12 If a theory cannot
supply truthmakers for propositions which are intuitively true, the theory ‘cheats’ its
ontological commitments.
Truthmaker theory challenges presentism’s fundamental claim that the past and
future do not exist.13 Most presentists assert that propositions about the past and fu-
ture are true. However, they are unable to account for the truth of these propositions
because they state that past and future events do not exist. Hence, propositions which
are about the past and future lack the existence of a past or future event to make them
true. For example, the proposition ‘Julius Caesar existed’ lacks a truthmaker because
Julius Caesar does not exist. The proposition is ungrounded which is an unacceptable
conclusion for an advocate of truthmaker theory. It is stated in premise (6) that a pro-
position about E is made true by the existence of E. Presentism is unable to account for
the truth of these propositions because E does not exist in the present moment.
The presentist has three options to avoid the truthmaker problem; reject truthmaker
theory, deny that there are true propositions about the past and future, or locate a truth-
maker in the presentmoment. I have assumed that truthmaker theory is true, and it has
been proved that there are true propositions about the future. Hence presentists are
left with the last option; to locate a truthmaker in the present moment. In the follow-
ing section, I present two theories which have aĴempted this and adapt them to object
against premise (6). If they are successful, propositions about E would not require the
existence of E to be made true.
4.2 Defending Premise (6)
First objection: Ned Markosian has argued that truthmaker theory does not present
a problem against presentism.14 Truthmakers for propositions about the future are
comprised of presently existing objects, their current arrangement, and the laws of
nature. To begin with, I summarise Markosian’s argument. This is followed by its
adaptation which will object to premise (6). Markosian stated truthmaking theory as
the following:
10. Rodriguez-Pereyra, “Why Truthmakers”, 21.
11. Theodore Sider, “Against Presentism”, in Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 40.
12. Sider, “Against Presentism”, 41.
13. NedMarkosian, “The Truth About the Past and the Future,” in Around the Tree: Semantic andMeta-
physical Issues Concerning Branching and the Open Future, ed. Fabrice Correia and Andrea Iacona, vol. 136
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 128. hĴps://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-007-5167-5_8.
14. Markosian, “The Truth About the Past and the Future.”
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The Truthmaker Principle: For every truth, p, there exist some things
x1, ..., xn, such that p is true in virtue of the existence and arrangement of
x1, ..., xn. 15
Markosian argued that presently existing objects are one component of a truth-
maker. They groundpropositions about the future in the presentmoment because they
are made from the same maĴer as future entities. The two other components needed
tomake a proposition true are the current arrangement of existing objects and the laws
of nature. The current arrangement of existing objects will be determined to exist in a
certain way by the laws of nature. This is the extent to which true propositions can be
made about their future existence. Notably, Markosian argued that the laws of nature
are unable to determine the existence of all future entities. In the present moment, the
propositions that refer to these entities are false. Hence, all three of the components
described above can make some propositions about the future true. Markosian stated
that this would work in the following way:
In 1,000 years there will be human outposts on Mars.
The laws of nature will determine the current arrangement of objects to form hu-
man outposts on Mars in 1,000 years. Propositions about human outposts on Mars
are grounded in the present moment by presently existing objects which will comprise
outposts. The proposition ‘In 1,000 years there will be human outposts on Mars’ is
made true by all three components.16 Markosian’s argument could offer a solution to
the truthmaker problem for presentists.
For Markosian’s argument to object against premise (6), it must be adapted to sup-
ply truthmakers for propositions about E. This could state that a proposition about E is
made true by presently existing entities, their arrangement and determined existence.
The laws of nature can be changed toGod’s actions in the presentmoment because they
both play the role of determining the existence of some future entities. As explained in
section 3, if God acts in the present moment to bring into existence E in the future, the
existence of E is determined. After the initial action, there are true propositions about
E. The existence of E is also determined by the current arrangement of existing ob-
jects. God’s decision to bring E into existence depends upon what exists in the present
moment. Hence, God’s action in the present moment and the current arrangement of
objects determines the truth values of propositions about E. Presently existing objects
ground propositions about E in the present moment because they will comprise E. All
three components make a proposition about E true in the present moment. Hence, the
adaptation of Markosian’s argument states that propositions about E can be made true
by truthmakers which are located in the present moment.
15. Ibid., 130.
16. Ibid., 131.
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This objection fails because presently existing objects are unable to ground propos-
itions about E. Markosian argued that propositions about the future can be grounded
by presently existing objects because they are made of the same maĴer as future ob-
jects. However, God can change or create maĴer without limitations because He is
omnipotent. Consequently, E could be made from a different combination of maĴer
or from an entirely newmaĴer. In these scenarios, propositions about the future could
not be grounded by presently existing maĴer. For example, God could commit action
X in the present moment, the combining of two colours, which in the future will create
a new colour. Once the colour is created, it is possible that it would not resemble any
existing colours and could not be made from existing colours. If this were the case,
there would not be maĴer in the present moment which could ground propositions
about the new colour. A proposition about the colour would require the future colour
to act as a truthmaker and ground the proposition. For this to be the case, the colour
would need to exist. Hence, this objection fails because it is possible for E to be made
of a different maĴer than presently existing objects. In this case, presently existing ob-
jects would be unable to ground propositions about E. Therefore, it has been shown
that Markosian’s adaptation does not adequately ground propositions about E in the
present moment.
The flaw inMarkosian’s argument demonstrates that propositions about E can only
be made true by the existence of E. God’s power is limitless in the present moment. In
each second leading up to an outcome, He is able to bend and change maĴer. The new
maĴer could therefore be entirely different to the maĴer that existed in the previous
present moment. Consequently, only the existence of E can be a truthmaker for pro-
positions about E. So far, premise (6) has been shown to be true; a proposition about E
can only be made true by the existence of E.
Second objection: Rhoda has argued that God’s existence in time can overcome the
truthmaker problem for presentism.17 God’s representational mental states of the past
can serve as truthmakers to make propositions about the past true. This argument can
be summarised: God remembers the past, experiences the present moment and anti-
cipates the future. As God is omniscient, He accurately remembers His experiences
of the past. These memories are concrete representational mental states which can
serve as truthmakers for propositions about past events.18 For example, God remem-
bers how Julius Caesar existed. Accordingly, His memories of how Caesar existed are
representational mental states formed from His experiences of Caesar. God’s repres-
entational mental state of Julius Caesar being assassinated can serve as a truthmaker
for the proposition that ‘Julius Caesar was assassinated’. Hence, Rhoda has argued
that propositions about the past can be made true by God’s representational mental
states.
Rhoda’s argument can be adapted to supply truthmakers for propositions about E.
17. Rhoda, “Presentism, Truthmakers, And God”.
18. Rhoda, “Presentism, Truthmakers, And God”, 54.
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Propositions about the future can bemade true byGod’s representationalmental states
of future events. As a result of the aĴribute of omniscience, God could form repres-
entational mental states of what future events would be like based on His experience
of viewing the past. As God creates E, He knows how E will exist and accordingly is
able to form mental states of E. These mental states could act as truthmakers to make
propositions about E true.
The problem with this adaptation is that God’s mental states, which do not rep-
resent how reality will be, could make false propositions true. God’s mental states,
whether or not they represent future reality, exist in the same capacity. So far, no
reason has been given which could explain why God’s mental states which represent
the future are able to make propositions true and not so the mental states which do
not represent the future. For this adaptation to successfully object against premise (6),
only God’s mental states which represent how reality will be should be able to make
propositions true.
It could be argued that only God’s mental states which God knows represent the
future can function as truthmakers. If God knows that some of His mental states are
inaccurate about the future, He knows that they do not represent any facts about the fu-
ture. God would be unable to know this by knowing one fact about the future. Rather,
God would have knowledge of the relevant facts about the future and could use these
facts to infer or deduce which future events are not going to happen. These mental
states could be categorised as non-factual states, meaning that they do not represent
any facts about the future which are known by God. If God knows that some of His
mental states accurately represent the future, He knows the future events which they
represent are going to happen. These could be categorised as factual mental states,
meaning they represent facts known by God about the future. It could be argued that
God’s mental states which do not represent the future are unable to function as truth-
makers, such that God’s non-factual mental states do not represent any facts about the
future which are known by God, and consequently are unable to ground propositions
about the future in facts. If the future is partly determined, Godmay not know if some
of His mental states represent the future because He would not know if the future
events that they represent are going to happen. These would be non-factual mental
states because they do not represent any future facts which are known by God and
therefore would be inadequate truthmakers. Hence, only God’s mental states which
He knows represent the future can act as truthmakers. God knowsmental states about
E are accurate because He knows E will exist. Mental states of E are categorised as
factual states. Hence, God’s mental states of E could make propositions about E true.
This objection fails because God’s foreknowledge does not affect the contents of His
representational mental states which makes propositions true. According to the above
argument, God’s foreknowledge can be used to assess whether His mental states are
factual or non-factual. On the other hand, propositions are made true by the contents
of God’s representational mental states. God knowing that a mental state misrepres-
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ents or represents the future does not affect the contents of His mental states. Consider
God’s mental state of a red flower existing. As God knows a red flower will exist, this
mental state is factual. Propositions about a red flower existing can be made true by
God’s mental state of a red flower. God could also have a mental state of a yellow
flower. God could know that there will not be a yellow flower. According to the above
argument, propositions about a yellow flower could not be made true by God’s men-
tal state of a yellow flower because they do not represent any facts. However, God’s
knowledge that the first mental state is factual and the second is non-factual does not
affect the contents of the mental states in either example. Regardless of this division,
the mental states exist in the same capacity. If the first mental state is able to function
as a truthmaker, the second mental state should also be a truthmaker. Hence, God’s
mental states which misrepresent the future should be able to make propositions true.
As stated above in the objection, God’s mental states which misrepresent the future
should not be able to make propositions true because those propositions would be
false. Hence, the adaptation of Rhoda’s theory fails because it allows for false propos-
itions to be made true by God’s mental states.
To summarise section 4.2, the objections above fail because they do not demon-
strate that propositions about E can be made true by anything other than the existence
of E. The adaptation of Markosian’s theory is unsuccessful because presently existing
objects are unable to ground propositions about E. The adaptation of Rhoda’s theory
fails because it allows for false propositions to be made true. Moreover, Markosian’s
objection shows that only the existence of E can serve as a truthmaker for propositions
about E. Hence, premise (6) is proved to be true; a proposition about E can only be
made true by the existence of E.
Premise (7) states that if propositions about E are true, it entails that E exists. Sec-
tion 3 has proved that propositions about E are true. It has been shown that propos-
itions about E can only be made true by the existence of E. It follows that E exists.
Consequently, premise (8) is true; some future entities exist. This is inconsistent with
presentism as it states only presently existing entities exist. Therefore, presentism is
inconsistent with the belief that God exists in time.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the belief thatGod exists in time is inconsistentwith present-
ism. In section 3, premise (2) was proved by the argument that if God performs action
Xwith the intention of effect Y, Y will happen. Premises (4) and (5) followedwhich led
to the conclusion, if God exists in time, there are true propositions about the future.
This should be relatively uncontroversial as Aquinas has produced a similar and well-
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established argument.19 Furthermore, it has been clearly explained how this argument
works within the framework of presentism. This led to section 4 which explained and
defended premises (6) to (8). Section 4.1 introduced truthmaker theory which is used
in premise (6). I have assumed that truthmaker theory is true as it is generally accep-
ted by both presentists and non-presentists. To overcome the truthmaker problem,
presentists must locate truthmakers for propositions about the future in the present
moment. In section 4.2, I explained how presentists might aĴempt to do this for pro-
positions about E. I have dedicated a large amount of this paper to explaining and
rejecting these objections because I expect that they will be used as the main argument
against my conclusion. I conclude in section 4.2 that propositions about E can only
be made true by the existence of E. The last part of section 4 explained premise (7); if
propositions about entities whose existence is caused by the direct intervention of God
are true, it entails that those entities exist. This resulted in premise (8); some future en-
tities exist. Hence, if God exists in time then future entities exist. Presentism states that
only presently existing objects exist. Therefore, this paper has shown that presentism
is inconsistent with the belief that God exists in time. In other words, God cannot only
exist in the present moment.
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